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Hannah Arendt argued that interreligious di erence and Christian theology are
steady in uences on political movements, action, and thought.
Notwithstanding her vast engagement with theology, Hannah Arendt is
considered an outsider to the intellectual milieu most readily associated with
political theology. Arendt thus refrains from the Schmittian all-encompassing
characterization of modern political institutions as containing a hidden
theological legacy. Peter E. Gordon argues that in contrast to Carl Schmitt, who
held that politics is essentially theological, “among Arendt’s most salutary
insights was that political theology only holds us in its grip if we bring to politics
an expectation of metaphysical or ‘eternal’ peace of a sort that worldly politics
seems forever unable to satisfy” (874). While Arendt depicts theology ’s impact on
politics as contingent, the following essay demonstrates that her thought holds a
steady reference to theology, describing its impact on politics a  rmatively.
According to several of her main works, religious notions facilitate individuals’
access to political power even as they do so in sporadic and ever-changing
manners. An overview of several of Arendt’s works—with focus on her Love and
Saint Augustine, Origins of Totalitarianism, and Eichmann in Jerusalem—
demonstrates two threads that envelop the connection of politics to religion:
 rst, a conceptualization of theological notions as evocative of political action
and second, an examination of Jewish history that exerts a critique of the
European nation state.  ese two threads encapsulate Arendt’s divergence from
liberal thought because they challenge the liberal endorsement of secularism
and, correspondingly, protective depictions of religious minorities.  
Neighborly Love and Communal Life
Arendt’s observations on theological notions bene tting interpersonal
interactions played an important role in her early thought. Her doctoral
dissertation o fered an analysis of St. Augustine’s thought. Arendt revised the
work in the 1960s and altered much of its discussion of theology to address her
later views on politics. Nonetheless, the  nal English translation, which builds
on those revisions, only appeared posthumously, in 1996. Arendt observes that
Augustine’s thought centered on a con lict between his neo-Platonic adherence
to a transcendental notion of love and a notion of accountability grounded in
relationships between fellow humans.  e Christian notion of caritas seeks to
reconcile the human search a ter the divine through the love of fellow human
beings.  e command to love one’s neighbor is a charged dictum: it opts to
surpass the initial disparity between the transcendental and the worldly objects
of human love. Augustine’s notion of neighborly love presumes the coexistence
of beings in the world and conceptualizes their relationship to one another as
uneasy.
 e published English version of the work correlates Augustine’s thought to
Arendt’s notion of “natality.”  is notion is central to Arendt’s observations on
political participation and action that are pertinent to her thought, particularly
during the 1960s. In Arendt’s reading, St. Augustine juxtaposes birth to the
creation of the world. Human life signals a fresh start. A birth of an individual
resembles the beginning of history.  e beginnings of human beings’ lives mark
their capacity to act in the world. An individual is aware of the concurrent
presence of other human beings who possess this ability. In Arendt’s mind,
Augustine is a theoretician of equality. In emphasizing our kinship with the
biblical Adam, Augustine referred to all humans as standing before God equal in
their sinfulness. 
Under the impact of existentialism, particularly Karl Jaspers and Martin
Heidegger, Arendt presents Augustine as a pioneering theoretician of human
existence. For Arendt, Augustine is a constitutive  gure for modern notions of
civil order (as she develops in her lecture “What is Freedom?”—a chapter in her
1961 book, Between Past and Future). Under the in luence of early Christianity, free
will is interlinked with the notion of sin and the corresponding idea that one
may act against one’s best interest.  e notion of freedom has been internalized
and correlated to one’s ability to will. Contextualizing this historical
transformation from a critical stance, Arendt views the agonized will that
operates against the self as leading to the association of power with oppression. 
Importantly for Arendt, Augustine disseminates this in luential Christian
emphasis on free will while at the same time complicating the impact
encapsulated in this emphasis. For Arendt, the Christian notion of free will
shi ts the de nition of freedom to focus on will rather than on action. While
presenting the notion of free will as it was conceptualized by Paul, Augustine
entertains, at the same time, an emphasis on human existence that is centered
on action—a move that Arendt endorses. Arendt’s comments on Augustine
follow the di ference she draws between “initium,” the capacity to begin anew
that is contained in the birth of each individual, and freedom, with the
con licted emphases (on the inner self and on action) that freedom encapsulates
in post-Christian political thought. Note that Arendt takes the understanding of
freedom as centered on will (rather than on action) as pertinent to modern
political thought. It follows that Augustine supplies keys to return to action as
the ultimate, productive core of freedom.
Religious Di ference and Political Participation   
According to Arendt, Jewish history is emblematic of tensions at the core of the
European nation state, a political entity that ostensibly promotes, since the late
Enlightenment, its citizens’ equal political rights. Arendt suggests that the
emancipation brought about by the late Enlightenment builds on the rights that
European rulers had granted to certain elites.  e social functions of court Jews,
individuals who ful lled high functions, particularly  nancial, in service of
royalty, had facilitated such rights.  e  gure of the court Jew is the basis of
Arendt’s portrayal of “ e Jew as Pariah.”  is title establishes that Jews could
never become genuine political agents in Europe: Jews may be either aware of
their exclusion and re lect it in their cultural artefacts (the Jews as pariahs) or
else they attempt incessantly to assimilate, e forts that result in their conditional
and temporary toleration (Jews as parvenus). Arendt’s work on Rahel Varnhagen,
a prominent Jewish intellectual, scrutinizes the latter’s life choices and role in
European society. In such enquires, Arendt focuses on Jewishness as a social
categorization that guides individuals’ incessant and ultimately unfruitful
attempt to assimilate.
Did the Enlightenment primarily advance the treatment of all individuals as
equal political agents, or did it expand minority rights, which had been granted
exclusively to groups that had bene ted the authorities? In her Origins of
Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt presents this question as naming a con lict at the
core of the European nation states. Arendt portrays European Jews’ attempts to
gain equal political rights as emblematic of a paradox of modern statehood.
Modern European states have opted to grant their members rights, but at the
same time, they have made political membership conditional and contingent.
According to the Origins of Totalitarianism’s historiographical account, Jewishness
receded as a marker of religion, becoming primarily an ethnic identity.  is
original depiction of dynamics pertinent to modern statehood builds Arendt’s
account of a minority as an elusive presence that has sporadic exchanges with
state authorities and intellectual elites. In this way, her analysis signi cantly
di fers from the liberal view that religious minorities are decisively excluded
from state power. 
Freedom, Equality and Action 
Arendt’s  e Life of the Mind (published posthumously in 1977/8) explores further
the will in a theological framework. In Arendt’s reading, early Christianity
accentuated the inner war generated by the human will with the agonizing
mechanism of acting against one’s best interest. In this context, Arendt refers
again to Augustine as highlighting internalized human struggle, but credits
him, at the same time, for conceptualizing creation in a manner that motivates
individual action. In sum, Arendt’s reliance on early Christianity leads her to
de ne free will in stark opposition to the liberal understanding of freedom as
ingrained in free choice. Her characterization of the virility of action through
theological vocabulary shows the extent to which her political thinking opposes
the view of secularization as the ultimate goal of political institutions (Moyn
2008, 73).  
In several works, such as “Freedom and Politics: A Lecture” (1960), Arendt
reiterates her view, established in her reading of Augustine, that freedom
centers on the possibility of human action granted to individuals with their
creation. Arendt draws attention to the conceptualization of freedom in early
Christianity by thinkers who were anti-political—this was a tradition that feared
the in luence of the public sphere on the individual. Arendt refers to Augustine
to clarify what she sees as the risk that totalitarianism bears for human freedom:
it eliminates human initiative and spontaneity.  erefore, she argues, modern
political transformations eradicate the capacity of miracles to change reality,
i.e., the openness of human action in the world.  e Life of the Mind revisits
Augustine to de ne both the Christian internalization of will and the keys to go
beyond this transformation by focusing on actions as bearing productive impact
on reality. 
Religion and the Social Realm 
As we have seen, the possibility of action animates, in Arendt’s mind, human
communal existence. It follows that the political sphere is a public realm that
necessitates the equality of its participants.  is presumption does not apply to
the social realm, which accommodates individuals’ free time and private
inclinations. Participation in the social realm is voluntary.  erefore, political
life does not, and should not, reconcile such social di ferences as religion,
ethnicity, and race. 
 e distinction between the political and social realms stood at the center of
Arendt’s responses to debates on human rights. For instance, it informed
Arendt’s controversial stance on racial segregation, particularly in education.
When protestors prevented nine black students from entering Little Rock High
School in 1957, following the US Supreme Court’s ruling that school segregation
was unconstitutional, commentators asked whether upholding racial
segregation in schools was a basic right of citizens. In a provocative essay,
Arendt agreed: the state cannot enforce racial integration just as it cannot
enforce racial segregation in the social realm, which is the realm of voluntary
association. In “Re lections on Little Rock,” she writes, “What equality is to the
body politics—its innermost principle—discrimination is to society. Society is
that curious, somewhat hybrid realm between the political and the private, in
which since the beginning of the modern age, most men spent the greater part
of their lives” (51). 
“Re lections on Little Rock” refers to religion in two ways. First, it juxtaposes
racism with antisemitism. At the beginning of the essay, Arendt equates Black
individuals with Jews as subjects whose di ference from hegemonic society is
preserved in the social realm. She maintains, at the same time, that Black
individuals are exceptional in that they are permanently “visible.”  is trait is
opposed, in her mind, to the “audible” presence of new immigrants. (She
discusses new immigrants through the lens of Jewish mobility in such works as
her essay “We Refugees,”) Some minorities appear more adept at hiding or
blurring their exceptional presence. Religious minorities’ elusive claim to power,
which Arendt traces in Jewish history, creates political conundrums that are at
the core of democracy, as we have seen. 
Second, “Re lections on Little Rock” suggests that, in contrast to political
institutions that are inoperative in the social sphere, churches hold the power to
regulate social discrimination: “ e only public force that can  ght social
prejudices is the churches, and they can do so in the name of the uniqueness of
the person, for it is on the principle of the uniqueness of souls that religion (and
especially the Christian faith) is based” (53).  is a  rmative account of the social
role of churches is another instance of Arendt’s curious anti-secularism, a trend
that animates her challenges to liberal politics.
A Mundane Form of Evil 
Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), another controversial work, takes in new directions
both Arendt’s analysis of Jewish history in the West and her commentary on the
a terlives of theological concepts with the work’s focus on evil. Arendt’s critique
of the trial’s biases pertains to the State of Israel, a new political entity, and to its
means of constituting its political sovereignty. A main strand in Arendt’s
argument is that the nature of the Eichmann trial is theatrical. She argues that
the trial served as a way for Israeli society to negotiate the memory of the Jewish
Holocaust and to ultimately present Israel as the sole safe haven for Jews.  e
trial’s public stature opened discussions of such charged topics as the actions of
the Jew councils (Judenräte), bodies that were accused of cooperation with the
Nazis during the war and of biased conduct in saving speci c Jewish individuals
while sparing others. 
How does Arendt’s famous depiction of Eichmann’s acts with the dictum “the
banality of evil” relate to her conceptualization of action as a derivation of
Christian theology?  e book and the dictum at its center proclaim that an
individual may be associated with evil without having intended to commit evil.
Eichmann’s implication in evil acts thus works against the notion that evil acts
indicate the corruption of the will. Eichmann’s testimony pronounces that he did
not think about the acts as he was committing them and did not silence his
conscience. It follows that conscience derives from thinking.  
Against the early Christian portrayal of the choice of evil as a fatal embrace of
sin, Arendt’s report on Eichmann shows evil as entrenched in everyday life with
the automatism and institutional participation that this implies. Arendt’s notion
of the banality of evil could be examined, therefore, as a secular turn in her
philosophy: a new conceptualization of human agency that is at odds with her
earlier belief that human action is best understood through theological
vocabulary. However, the banality of evil could also be understood as
corresponding with the rise of distinctive modern phenomena, particularly,
totalitarianism. Modernity has irreversibly transformed the individual: the
openness of human action has largely come to a halt.  e era of miracles has
ceased.
What are the preconditions for political action? Who is able to become a part of a
political community? In addressing these questions, Arendt takes theological
notions to saturate political action. Arendt’s comments on Augustine inform her
account of human equality in the political realm because she takes him to stress
that every human being is independent from the Creator since his or her
moment of creation. 
As we have seen, there are several links to political theology in Arendt’s inquiries
into the conditions for European fascism.  ose conditions are entangled,  rst,
with sporadic attempts to integrate Jews into European societies. Arendt
registers throughout her oeuvre Jews’ attempts at gaining social power  by
assimilating into European culture. Attempts at assimilation show that some
Jewish individuals failed to acknowledge that exclusion was shared by all
German Jews. While early Christian dogmas mark a vision of human equality in
the political realm, Jewish-Christian di ference animates Arendt’s view of the
social realm as one that should uphold interpersonal di ference (racial, religious,
ethnic, or other). A second link to fascism is in a persona that breaks with early
Christian theology: an individual whose implication in sin does not  t with the
theological de nition regarding the corruption of the will. Arendt follows the
possibility of theology to shape the e  cacy of political acts since the beginning
of Western civilization, but she takes the automatic nature of human acts under
totalitarianism to herald a caesura in that tradition. 
I thank Liesbeth Schoonheim and Michael Weinman for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this essay. 
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A short overview of Kojin Karatani’s Marxist in uenced focus on modes of exchange as revealing the Borromean ring of











“Perhaps it is in precisely this ambivalent way that air (and Irigaray) reminds us of just how much we belong—to the air
itself, to this emptiness that hovers and sings in lifedeath. We might forget air, we might forget that we breathe, or how
to breathe. But air does not forget us. And air will never cease to carry us, to lift us up, to set us into  ight, even when we





David Kline introduces the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann for political theology and re ects on how it might think





A re ection on the political implications of N. Katherine Hayles’ critical aesthetic inquiry into the ecological relationships





Isabelle Stengers, continental philosopher of science, o ers pragmatic resources for animating thinking with interest and






“[For] quantum gnostics, there has never been a creation of the world or in the world—it is the world that is ‘wicked’ or





Rafael Vizcaíno o ers a biographical introduction to the philosophical work of Enrique Dussel, a major  gure of the






It is as productive to think with as it is to think against Claude Lefort, a revolutionary-turned-philosopher who analyzed
power and the political regimes to which it gives rise.
Read Essay
By Michael Allan & Mayanthi Fernando & Noah Salomon
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Saba Mahmood
Saba Mahmood (1962-2018) was a pioneering anthropologist of Islam and secularism, a feminist theorist of gender and











The late public intellectual Stuart Hall, with his concept of the conjuncture, assists political theology in analyzing our
current moment and potential interventions.
Read Essay
By Basit Kareem Iqbal & Milad Odabaei
May 11, 2021
Talal Asad
Rather than establishing structural analogies or historical  liations between “religion” and “politics” (terms he opens to





Meillassoux’s thinking of post-Copernican cosmic immanence and cosmic delegitimation constitutes a challenge to




Hannah Arendt argued that interreligious di erence and Christian theology are steady in uences on political
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